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  OLS estimates of partner choice equations are biased when the unobservables 
determining partner choice are correlated with the unobservables determining the likelihood of 
marriage.  This paper presents an example..  A theoretical model generates a two-equation model 
empirical model in which  unobservables are correlated a priori. Estimates of the model using 
data from the PSID indicate that men and women select positively into marriage.  OLS Estimates 
of the effects of education and race (black relative to white)  on partner’s education are biased 
downward. 
  
                                                 
* This paper was presented at the Econometric Society Winter Meetings (2005) and the PAA 
Economic Demography Workshop (2006). This research was supported by NIH Grant 
R03HD41611.  I am grateful to Janice Compton and David Ribar for helpful comments and 
suggestions.  Kisa Watanabe and Jelena Zurovic provided excellent research assistance.   1
I.  Introduction 
  
  There is a long literature in economics, and in the social sciences more broadly, 
describing the determinants of marriage.  Other papers explain the choice of spouse.   However, 
these two outcomes are determined simultaneously:  a woman’s decision to marry depends upon 
the selection of husbands available to her in the marriage market.  When unobservables 
determining the likelihood of marriage and the spouse’s characteristics are correlated, OLS 
estimates of the partner choice equation will be biased.  There has, as of yet, been little attention 
to this point.
1   
  In this paper I propose an example in which the two sets of unobservables will be 
correlated a priori.  Given her own attributes and marriage market conditions, a woman’s optimal 
partner is chosen by trading off partner quality for a fraction of marital output.  She chooses to 
marry by comparing her consumption when married to this optimal partner with her consumption 
when single. The theory implies a selection model in which her parents’ religion and religiosity 
when she was growing up, and the sex composition of her children, enter into the marriage, but 
not the partner choice equations.   
  I estimate the model with data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
Parallel analyses are undertaken for both men and women.  Men and women are both positively 
selected into marriage on the basis of unobservables.  The selection effect is larger for men than 
women. The results suggest that failing to consider issues of selection when estimating partner 
choice equations leads to downward bias in estimates of the effect of high school completion and 
race on partner education. 
                                                 
1 One paper that does look at selection issues in equations estimated for samples of married 
couples include Foster (2002) who estimate the effect of parents’ characteristics on desired 
education for children in rural Bangladesh.  Clark and Etile (2006) model whether a spouse 
smokes.  Neal (2004) and Willis (1999) allow for selection into marriage when modeling 
nonmarital childbearing; Rosenzweig (1999) allows for selection into marriage when modeling 
nonmarital childbearing.   2
    Section II describes the theoretical model of marriage and partner choice which underlies 
the econometric analysis. Section III describes the econometric model and discusses econometric 
issues.  Section IV describes the data, and Section V presents the results.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  Economic Model of Marriage and Partner Choice 
  This is a partial equilibrium model of the marriage market, which is described from the 
perspective of a woman.  The empirical model will be estimated for both women and men.   
  Women maximize utility, which depends on consumption (C) and marital status (M).     
    (,(,, ) φ = i UU C h X Z M      ( 1 )  
C is a continuous variable, and M is a dummy variable which equals 1 if she is married and 0 if 
she is not.  The function h(.) reflects her preferences for marriage, and depends on observables,  
X  and Z ,  and unobservables,  φ .   
  Each woman brings three types of attributes to the marriage market.  First, there is a 
vector   X  of characteristics, such as education, that are observable to both the market and to the 
researcher.  There are also two types of unobservables - characteristics that are observable to the 
market, but not to the researcher.  L μ  represents intelligence and the other standard 
unobservables in earnings equation that favorably impact labor market outcomes.   H μ  represents 
characteristics such as beauty and domestic skills that are more closely associated with home 
productivity.  As Becker (1973) points out, unobservable attributes such as intelligence and 
appearance (as well as observables such as education) potentially impact both labor market and 
home productivity. 
  This problem is separable and is solved in two stages.  The first step is to solve for a 
woman’s optimal partner, given her observables, her unobservables, and the marriage market.  
The second step is to determine whether or not she will marry by comparing her utility when 
married to her optimal partner and her utility when single.     3
  The market poses a tradeoff between share of marital output, ( ) 0,1 α ∈ , and husband 
quality, Q.  Individuals face a range of (Q,α ) pairs, and the fraction of output,α , is negotiated 
prior to marriage.  The choice is summarized by the expression: 
 (; , , ,) LH QX α αμ μ π =          (2) 
where π  represents market conditions favorable to women and the tradeoff between quality and 
division of output is reflected by the assumption   0 Q α < .    α is increasing in X,  π , and the  
μ ’s.
2   
  A married woman’s consumption is described by the expression:    
   (; , , ) (; , , ) M LH LH CQ X g Q X α μμ μμ =⋅          (3)      
where ( ; , , ) LH gQXμ μ is marital output, which depends on husband quality and wife’s 
characteristics. 
  Given her abilities and market conditions, the maximum consumption a woman can 
obtain in marriage is obtained from the solution of the problem: 
  m a x m a x( ; ,,, ) ( ; ,,) Ma r MH MH QQ CQ X g Q X α μμπ μμ =  (4) 
The solution of this problem is: 
    * * ( , , , ) MH QQ X μ μπ =       ( 5 )  
  A single woman’s consumption depends on her observables, X, and the two unobservable 
components: 
   (, , ) SL H Cf X μ μ =        ( 6 )  
  She will marry if her utility from marrying her optimal husband outweighs her utility 
from being single
3; i.e., if:  
                                                 
2 Several economists, most notably Duncan Thomas (1990) argue that a spouse’s education 
reflects his or her bargaining power within the household.   4
   (( * ) , ( , , ) 1 ) ( , 0 ) 0 MS MU CQh Z X U C φ =⋅ − >       (7) 
 or, in reduced form, 
    (,,, , , ) LH MM X Z π μμφ =      >  0     (8) 
III. Estimation 
  The econometric model of marriage and partner choice is obtained by linearizing 
equations (5) and (8): 
 * QQ Q QX β πγ ε =+ +        ( 9 a )  
  M MM M MX Z β πγ δ ε =+ + +         ( 9 b )  
X ,  π , and Z  are vectors of observables, and   k β ,   k γ  and  k δ  ( {, } kQ M ∈ ) are the respective 
vectors of coefficients.   0 1 MM >⇔ =   indicates that a woman is married.  The error terms in 
(9a) and (9b) can be expressed in terms of the unobservables  L μ , H μ  and φ , and constants a, b, 
c, d and e:    
        QL H ab ε μμ =+       ( 1 0 a )  
   MLH cd e ε μμφ =+ +        (10b) 
  The selection model is estimated under maximum likelihood, assuming that  M ε   and  Q ε    
are distributed bivariate normal.  As Heckman (1977) points out, estimating (9a) under OLS 
yields biased estimates.  When  M ε   and  Q ε    are distributed bivariate normal:  
   [| 1 ] [ | 1 ] QQ Q Q EQ M X E M β πγ ε == + + = 
                          cov( , ) ( ) QQ Q Q M M M M XX Z β πγ ε ε λ β πγ δ =+ + + +    (11)  
where ( ) MM M XZ ++ λ βπ γ δ  is the inverse mills ratio.  Standard errors are corrected for the fact 
that there are repeated observations on individuals.   
                                                                                                                                                             
3 I refer to the continuous latent variable associated with the outcome marriage as M   rather than 
the conventional M*, to distinguish it from the “*” referring to the optimal choice, as Q* in (5).   5
 Because  Z  is included in (9b) but not (9a), the model is identified (in addition to the 
identification through nonlinearity).   
  The covariance between the error terms can be expressed as: 
   () cov( , ) cov , ε εμ μ μ μ φ =++ +
QM L H L H ab cde  
  
22
,, () μμ μ μ μ μφ φ σσ σ σ σ =+ + + + +
LL H H L L H ac ad bc bd ae be    (12) 
When (12) is positive we have positive selection:  On net, the unobservables associated with 
attaining a high quality spouse are positively correlated with the unobservables affecting the 
propensity to marry.  When the unobservable endowments leading to a greater likelihood of 
marriage and stronger performance in the marriage market are positively correlated 
, 0) ( μμ σ >
LH  the bias will be more positive.  If the correlation between marriage market and 
labor market unobservables is higher for men than for women, then the selection bias is more apt 
to be positive for men.  The covariance will be higher when unobservables affecting labor market 
outcomes and unobservables affecting marriage market outcomes are more correlated.   L μ   has a 
stronger effect on the former, and  H μ  has a stronger effect on the latter.
4 
However, if, say, c is sufficiently negatively, or if the twoμ ’s are sufficiently negative 
correlated, then we have negative selection.  Then, married women have less favorable 
unobservables than single women. .   
  A test for the presence of selection is a test of whether:          
    (, )c o v (, ) / ( )
QM QM QM εε ρ εε εε σσ ≡ ≠  0   (13) 
While we cannot estimate the parameters, a, b, c, d and e individually, we can conjecture about 
the sign and relative magnitude of (12) (and therefore (13)) in various cases.  For instance, by 
                                                 
4 Appearance does affects labor market outcomes (Hammermesh, 1994, 1998, 2000).  This does 
not impact the identification but does affect the interpretation of the results.   6
assumption, L μ   and  H μ  increase value in the marriage market and φ measures preferences for 
marriage.  This implies that a, b and e > 0, respectively.    
  For men, observables associated with labor market success are also positively associated 
with marriage (Korenman and Neumark, 1991).  For women, the relationship between (potential) 
career success and marriage (net of motherhood) is less clear (Korenman and Neumark 1991, 
Breusch and Gray 2004, Light 200), but it appears to be less positive for women than men.  If 
unobservables  L μ  have the same relationship with marriage that observables such as education 
and other human capital variables,  Men Women cc >  and  0 Men c > .  While it is hard to say if ability in 
home production is associated with greater likelihood of marriage for men, it is likely that it is 
for women; i.e., that  0 Women d > , and that the effect is larger for women than for men; i.e., 
Women Men dd > . 
  Unless the individual covariance terms in (12) are strongly negative, or d is sufficiently 
negative, which seem unlikely, (12) will be positive for men.  Moreover, the elements of the first 
term will tend to be substantially larger for men than for women:  labor market success is far 
more likely to be associated with favorable labor market outcomes, and the unexplained variance 
in earnings is larger for men than for women.  Therefore, we would expect (13) to be larger for 
men than for women. 
  To some extent, the omitted variables in the two equations can be proxied by parents’ 
education.  On one hand, there could be explicit matching on parents’ characteristics, as 
discussed in Fernandez (2004).  Alternatively, parents’ education may proxy for some 
unmeasurable individual characteristics (Lam and Schoeni, 1993).  
   7
IV.  Data 
  The analysis uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The PSID is a 
panel data set which began in 1968 as a sample of 5000 households in the 48 contiguous states of 
the United States.  The individuals in these households, and splitoff households, were resurveyed 
annually until 1997, at which point they were surveyed every other year.   
  The dependent variable, spouse quality (Q) is measured as years of education.  
Regressors include a woman’s own characteristics ( X )  and marriage market characteristics 
(π ).  Own characteristics include age (Age) and race (White).  Own education is entered in some 
specifications linearly (Education) . In other specifications,  education is entered as a pair of 
dummy variables corresponding to 12 and 16 years of education (Own_High, Own_Coll).   
Region of residence (South/Northeast/Northcentral; omitted category is West) represents the 
marriage market characteristics, π .  As parents’ education is reported as a categorical variable in 
the PSID, the measures used indicate whether each parent graduated high school (Mom_High, 
Dad_High) and college (Mom_Coll and Dad_Coll).   
  Two types of variables are included inZ . Subset  1 Z  includes measures of the religion 
and religiosity of the subject’s father, or the head of the household when she was growing up.  
Subset  2 Z  is a measure of the gender of her children. 
  There is substantial precedent for using religion and religiosity as instruments in models 
of the effect of family status on some outcome (e.g., Lundberg and Plotnick,1985; Plotnick; 
1990, 1992).   Gruber (2005) uses religious market density to explain the likelihood of marriage 
and divorce.   Parental, rather than own religiosity is used here in order to capture the effect of 
external social norms in shaping individual’s marriage decisions.  Using variables based on 
parental responses when the subject herself was a child also diminishes concerns about 
correlation of the element of   1 Z  with  Q ε .       8
  Religiosity is characterized in terms of number of times the parent attended religious 
services.    The categories are None, Some (less than once per week), More, (about once per 
week), and Lot (more than once per week). The four religion categories I use are Protestant_1, 
Protestant_2, Catholic and Other.  Protestant_1 includes Lutherans, Methodists, Episcopalians 
and Presbyterians, or “mainline protestants” (Lehrer 2000 and others).  The possible responses 
vary by round on the PSID.  Appendix Tables A-1 and A-2 map the original PSID responses into 
the religiosity and religion categories. 
  Bedard and Deschenes (2005) use child sex to instrument for women’s marital status in a 
study of the effect of divorce on women’s economic status.  The motivation for using child sex in 
2 Z is the set of findings reported in the literature that child sex affects the likelihood of marriage, 
and the likelihood of divorce (Morgan et al, 1988; Lundberg and Rose, 2003;  Dahl and Moretti, 
2004).  The measure of the sex composition used is First_Boy_Minus_First_Girl.  This is the 
difference between the dummy variable indicating whether the first child born is a boy and the 
dummy variable indicating whether the first child born is a girl.  Because the mean of this 
variable will be approximately zero for women with children and women with no children, issues 
of endogenous fertility with respect to the sex composition of the children are minimized.    
  I use data on individuals between age 25 and 35, inclusive, from 1983 forward.  While it 
would be desirable to look at a longer period and wider age range, there was not sufficient 
coverage of the religion and religiosity variables for individuals who were marriageable age 
outside this window.  “Nonsample individuals” – those who married into or moved into PSID 
households or splitoff households – were excluded from the sample to avoid endogeneity 
problems.  This yielded samples of 20008 women and 18101 men, respectively after deleting   9
observations with missing values.
5  Means and standard deviations of key variables are reported 
in Appendix Table 3.
  
 
V.  Results 
Women 
    The results for women are reported in Tables 1 and 2.  Table 1 reports the benchmark 
OLS results. The baseline OLS specification, reported in column 1, includes own Education, 
White, and dummy variables for Region, Year and Age.  Every year of education a woman gets 
increases her expected husband’s education by somewhat more than a half (0.562, t=21.78) of a 
year.   Race is significant as well: being white increases husband’s education by somewhat less 
than half (0.534, 5=4.21) of a year. 
    Parents’ education variables are introduced into the model in Column 2
6  .   Mother’s 
education has no significant effect, although a woman’s father’s education increases her spouse’s 
education substantially.   If her father graduated high school, her husband’s education is about a 
third of a year (0.354, t=2.73) higher.   If her father graduated college as well, her husband’s 
education is nearly a half a year (0.452, t=2.58) higher on top of that.  This echoes Lam and 
Schoeni’s (1993) finding, using data from Brazil, that a woman’s father’s education is positively 
related to her husband’s earnings.  The coefficients on Education and White fall somewhat when 
parents’ education is introduced, suggesting that these variables reflect some of the unobserved 
heterogeneity that was picked up by Education and White in the simpler specification. 
                                                 
5 For women (men), 1109 (1047) observations were deleted because of missing region, 20 (30) 
for missing race, 810 (730) for missing education, 2404 (2064) for missing religiosity and 972 
(569) for missing religion.   
6 The sample size is smaller when parents’ education is included.  I estimated the models in 
columns 1 and 3 using the sample from columns 2 and 4, respectively, in order to gauge whether 
differences were attributable to the difference in the sample or the difference in the specification.  
The results for the analysis reported in this table and others indicate that the differences are due 
to the difference in the specification rather than sample.      10
    Columns 3 and 4 repeat the analyses in columns 1 and 2, respectively, the only exception 
being that education is entered non-linearly: as a pair of dummy variables for high school 
(Own_High) and college (Own_Coll).  The results indicate that relationship is non-linear:  the 
college education coefficients are nearly twice as large as the high school coefficients.  As with 
the linear education specification, the effect of own education is attenuated when parents’ 
education is included. 
Results of the selection models are reported in Table 2.    Having a first son relative to a 
daughter leads to a lower likelihood of marriage (z=1.62 to z=1.94 in columns 1 and 4, 
respectively). 
Inferences about biases in OLS coefficients can be made by comparing the OLS and 
selection corrected results.  Despite the fact that women are positively selected into marriage, the 
selection corrected Education and Own_Coll coefficients are similar to the respective OLS 
coefficients.  The selection corrected coefficient on Own_High coefficient is somewhat greater 
than the OLS coefficient.  The selection correct coefficient on White is substantially greater than 
the OLS coefficient.   For instance, in terms of the column 2 results, the selection corrected 
estimate .840 (z=3.65) is more than double the OLS estimate of .393 (t=3.00).  This suggests that 




  The OLS education coefficents for men reported in Table 3 and similar to those for 
women in Table 1.  However, the results for race and for parents’ education are different.  There 
is no significant effect of race on spouse quality in the specifications that do not exclude parents’ 
education.  The estimates that control for education suggest that being which lowers the   11
education of a man’s optimal feasible partner.  For men, mother’s, as well as father’s education 
helps a man obtain a more educated spouse. 
  The results suggest marked selection bias on the OLS results in several respects.  The 
OLS Education coefficient from Column 2 in Table 5 was 0.474; the comparable selection 
corrected estimates were both 0.512 – indicating that the OLS estimate was biased downward by 
.038 or 7.4 percent. More striking is the difference in the coefficient on White.  While the OLS 
coefficients were small and insignificant or even negative, the selection model yields estimates 
ranging from .357 (z=2.47) to .570 (z=3.95).   There is significant positive selection for men:  
(, ) QM ρ εε  ranges from 0.71 to 0.78, andcov( , ) QM ε ε ranges from 1.34 to 1.45. 
 
Discussion  
  Own education, parents’ education, and White, are associated with marrying a high 
quality partner:  Coefficients on own education, when entered linearly and as a pair of dummy 
variables are positive in all specifications for both men and women.  Parents’ education 
coefficients are either positive or not significant.  The effect of being white is positive in all 
specifications except the OLS specification for men, where it is either insignificant or negative. 
  In terms of the effects of these variables on the likelihood of marriage, education overall 
increases the likelihood of marriage, as does having completed twelve years of education. 
However, given that a man, or a woman, has a high school degree, having a college degree does 
not increase the likelihood of marriage in this sample.  Conditional on own education, parents’ 
education has a negative effect on the likelihood of marriage, if any.    
  In Section II it was conjectured that there would be positive selection for both men and 
women.  Also, as the characteristics associated with success in the marriage market are more 
closely associated with human capital unobservables for men than for women, the selection 
effect,cov( , ) QM ε ε , would be more positive for men.  This is supported in the results, in which   12
the correlations between the error terms range from 1.37 to 1.45 for men and from 0.83 to 1.31 
for women. 
  How do we interpret the differences between the OLS and selection corrected estimates?  
In the very simplest case, when a variable increases the likelihood of marriage, and 
cov( , ) QM ε ε > 0, we would then expect to find the OLS coefficient to be smaller than the 
corrected coefficient.  For instance, suppose education increases the likelihood of marriage 
(which it does), and unobservables associated with marriage are positively correlated with 
unobservables associated with spouse quality (which they are).   The OLS education coefficient 
reflects not only the effect of education but the fact that those who respond to the incentive at the 
margin have less favorable unobservables than those who were married anyway.  The selection 
model explicitly separates the two effects.   
  The differences between the OLS and selection corrected education coefficients are 
modest, but tend to be greater for men than for women.  For men, the (column 1) selection 
corrected estimate of the effect of Education is 3.5 percentage points, or 7.3 percent greater than 
the OLS estimate.  For women, the difference is 1.9 percentage points, or 3.3 percent.  Breaking 
the education variables into dummy variables for high school and college reveals that the 
differences vary by level of education.  The (column 3) coefficients on Own_Coll are very 
similar in the OLS and corrected specifications for both men and women.  However, the 
Own_High coefficient is 30 percentage points (35.4 greater) than the OLS estimate for men, and 
35 percentage points (45) percent greater than the OLS coefficient for women. 
  Differences in the effects of race are striking.  OLS estimates of the coefficients on White 
are substantially lower than selection corrected effects. For instance, for men, the OLS result in 
column (4) of Table 5 is -0.213 (t=1.89), suggesting that white men marry less educated women 
than non-white men. However, the comparable selection corrected effect from Table 6 is 0.357 
(z=2.47), and the coefficient on White in the marriage equation is positive and significant.    13
Intuitively, if we could take a non-white man at the margin of marriage and make him white he 
would marry, but he would bring with him lower unobservables ( Q ε ) – such as perhaps 
unmeasured family background -  on average, than the men who were already married.   
  The comparisons for women are dramatic as well:  the column (4) OLS estimate of the 
White coefficient from Table 2 is 0.340 (t=2.47).  Unlike the estimate for men, this is positive.  
However, it is still far smaller than the corrected estimate: approximately one-third of the Table 4 
corrected coefficient of 0.969 (z=4.24).   Inferences based on OLS coefficients would be terribly 
off.  It is notable that White has a particularly strong effect on the likelihood of marriage in the 
first stage equations (this is obscured because of the interactions).  In general, researchers should 
interpret with caution estimated OLS partner choice coefficients on variables that also have a 
strong effect on the likelihood of marriage.      
 
VI.  Conclusion 
  Uncorrected, and selection corrected, models of partner choice for men and women are 
estimated with data from the PSID.  Both men and women select positively into marriage.  The 
OLS race coefficient is biased downward considerable; some education coefficients are biased as 
well.     
  As expected, men are more positively selected into marriage than women.  This is 
consistent with the notion that the unobservables relating to quality of spouse and likelihood of 
marriage are more closely aligned for men than for women.    
  The difference between the OLS and selection correction effects of race and high school 
completion on partner quality raises questions about estimates of partner choice models or 
marriage matching patterns in general when selection effects have not been taken into account.  
  The results have implications for policy measures, such as reducing the marriage penalty 
in the tax code and funding counseling programs for marriages in conflict, aimed at stemming   14
the decline in marriage.  There is positive selection into marriage in terms of unobservables as 
well as readily measured observables such as education.  Estimates of selection based on 
observables such as race and education will not fully account for the degree of selection into 
marriage.  We cannot expect the individuals responding, at the margin to marriage promotion 
policies to realize the same outcomes as those who entered into marriage autonomously.     15
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 Table 1  
OLS (Women) 
Dependent Variable:  Husband’s Education 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 





Education ≥ 12 
(Own_High) 




Education ≥ 16 
(Own_Coll) 









(3.00)  (4.14) (2.47) 
Mom High     0.263 
   
0.108           
 (0.82)   (1.92) 
Mom Coll     -0.054 
   
-0.051          
(-0.27)   (-0.28) 
Dad High     0.421 
   
0.354           
 (2.73)    (3.05) 
Dad Coll     0.61 
  
0.452        
(2.58)    (3.09) 
Other  Regressors  (a) (a) (a) (a) 
N  Obs.  8553 8310 8553 8310 
 
(a) Dummies for individual’s age, region of residence (South, Northeast, Northcentral), and 
year of observation.  Standard errors corrected for multiple observations by individual. 
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 Table 2 
Selection Model 
Dependent Variable:  Husband’s Education 










Education  0.044 
(3.57) 




0.532    
(17.7) 
 
   
Education ≥ 12 
(Own_High)        0.384    
(5.21) 
1.588    
(8.05)   
0.404 
(5.13) 
 1.345   
(6.74) 
Education ≥ 16 
(Own_Coll)        0.026 
(.38) 
2.131    
(14.9)   
0.047 
(0.65) 
 1.910   
(12.5) 










1.261    
(6.43)   
0.354 
(1.89) 
0.969   
(4.24) 
Mom High     0.028 
(0.43) 






 0.261   
(1.85) 








-0.194   
(-0.89) 
Dad High     -0.029 
(-0.46) 






0.371    
(2.55) 
Dad Coll     -0.017 
(-0.20) 





































































































































P-value  <0.001    <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  
N obs:   Full/Uncen.  20008  8553  18761  8310  20008  8553  18761  8310 
(, ) QM ρ εε |  (, ) QM σ εε  





















Dependent Variable:  Wife’s Education 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 





Education ≥ 12 
(Own_High) 
    1.134          
(7.90) 
0.844          
(5.96) 
Education ≥ 16 
(Own_Coll) 
    2.197          
(17.76) 
1.892          
(13.70) 
























Other  Regressors  (a) (a) (a) (a) 
N Obs.  7592   7303  7592   7303 
 
(a) Dummies for individual’s age, region of residence (South, Northeast, Northcentral), and 
year of observation.  Standard errors corrected for multiple observations by individual. 
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 Table 4 
Selection Model (Men) 
Dependent Variable:  Wife’s Education 



















    
Education ≥ 12 
(Own_High) 
       0.48 
(7.05) 




1.209   
(8.05)   
Education ≥ 16 
(Own_Coll) 
       0.025 
(0.37) 




 1.890   
(12.5) 










0.582     
(3.98)      
0.30 
(1.53) 












0.310   
(2.51) 






















0.418   
(3.46) 














































































































White *  Some     0.237 
(1.21) 
















White * A lot  -0.0056 
(-0.04) 







P-value 0.024    0.104    0.020    0.06   
N obs:   Full/Uncen.  18101  10509  16440  9137  18101  10509  16440  9137 
(, ) QM ρ εε | ( , ) QM σ εε  
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Appendix Table 1 




Possible Responses  Coded 
As… 
0 Never  Never
a 
1  Once in a while, a  few times a year, not often, 
seldom 
Some 
2  About once a month, sometimes  More 
3  Every few weeks, several times a month, once 
or twice a month, often 
Lot 
4  Every few weeks, several times a month, once 
or twice a month, often 
Lot  
5  More than once a week, once a week plus  Lot 
1968  How often do you 
(HEAD) go to 
church?   
6 NA  Missing 
0 Never  Never
a 
1 Hardly  ever  Some 
2  About once a month, sometimes  More 
3  Every few weeks, several times a month  Lot 
4  Every week, once a week  Lot 
5  More than once a week, once a week plus  Lot 
1969  How often do you 
(HEAD) go to 
church?  
9 NA  Missing 
0 Never  Never
a 
1   Once a week or more  Lot 
2  Once a month  More 




How often do you 
(HEAD) go to 
religious services? 
9 NA  Missing 
 
a “Never” is omitted category. 
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Appendix Table 2  
Coding of “Religion” 
 
Year  Question  PSID   Possible Responses  Variable
1  Baptist  Prot_2 
2  Episcopalian  Prot_1 
3  Methodist  (including African Methodist)  Prot_1 
4  Presbyterian  Prot_1 
5  Lutheran  Prot_1 
6  Congregationalist & Disciples of Christ; United Church 
of Christ; Dutch Reform; Friends, Quaker; Latter Day 
Saints, Mormon; Unitarian; Universalists; Bahai, 




7  Other Protestant; Protestant but NA denomination  Prot_2 
8  Catholic  Catholic 













what?  What 
denominatio
n is that? 
0  NA, DK, Other, None  Missing 
1  Roman Catholic  Catholic 
2  Jewish  Other 
3  Baptist   Prot_2 
4  Lutheran  Prot_1 
5  Methodist; African Methodist  Prot_1 
6  Presbyterian  Prot_1 
7  Episcopalian  Prot_1 
8  Protestant, Unspec.  Prot_2 
9  Other Protestant  Prot_2 
10  Other Non-Christian: Muslim, Rastafarian  Other 
11  Latter Day Saints; Mormon  Prot_2 
12  Jehovah’s Witnesses  Prot_2 
13  Russian/Greek Orthodox  Prot_2 
14  “Christian”  Prot_2 
15  Unitarian; Universalist  Prot_2 
16  Christian Science  Prot_2 
17  Seventh Day Adventist  Prot_2 
18  Pentecostal  Prot_2 
19  Amish, Mennonite  Prot_2 
20  Quaker, Friends  Prot_2 










what?  What 
denominatio
n is that? 
00  Inap.; none, atheist, agnostic  Missing 
21  Church of God  Prot_2 
22  United Church of Christ; Congregational Church   Prot_2 
23  Reformed, Christian Reformed  Prot_2 
24  Disciples of Christ; United Christian; First Christian; 
Christian Holiness 
Prot_2 
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Appendix Table 3 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 
 Women  Men 




At Least High School (Own_High) 





At Least College (Own_Coll) 











Mother High School 











Father High School 











































































Sample size  20008  18101 
 